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Sierra Club v. San Antonio: In Search of the
Appropriate Application of the Buiford Abstention*
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Burford v. Sun Oil Co. was decided in the 1943 Supreme Court term.
The well known "Burfonf' or "administrative" abstention doctrine evolved
from this important case. 2 A departure from the recently created Pullman
abstention, Burford was to become another of the difficult to apply abstention doctrines whose appropriate application and scope remain something
of a mystery. The Supreme Court has had other opportunities to utilize the
Burford abstention, but has found it appropriate in only one instance eight
years after the abstention was first articulated in Burford. The lower courts
have found the Burford abstention more attractive and have had more occasions in which to apply it, but the courts remain in conflict regarding the
proper application and scope of the Burford abstention. Considering the
lack of consensus among the courts some scholars question whether it has
been well enough defined to appropriately be called a "doctrine" at all. 3
In this climate of controversy every application of the Burford abstention is closely scrutinized and critiqued in an effort to find the appropriate
scope and definition of the abstention. Such is the backdrop to the Fifth
Circuit's application of the Burford abstention in Sierra Club v. City of
San Antonio. 4
This Note will compare and contrast the application and scope of the
Burford abstention in Sierra Club with the Supreme Court's treatment of
the doctrine. It will also consider the propriety of the Fifth Circuit's alternative application of the Burford abstention and whether there is sufficient
justification for abstention in the absence of a substitute state forum. This
Note will then discuss a possible conclusion to what the appropriate scope
and application of the abstention might be.
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II. BACKGROUND

It is widely recognized that the jurisdiction which Congress has chosen
to confer upon the federal courts is not a matter of the courts' discretion,
but is generally mandatory. 5 However, over the years some judicially developed exceptions to the mandatory jurisdiction requirement have
evolved. These so-called "abstentions" allow a federal court to decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a suit otherwise properly within the jurisdiction
of the federal court. These abstentions are considered to be the exception
rather than the rule because they pose one important problem: litigants are
deprived of an intended federal forum in which to litigate their claims.
Because the abstentions are not water-tight compartments and are
closely related, a basic understanding of the Pullman abstention is helpful
in a discussion of the Buiford abstention. The Pullman abstention originated in 1941 in Railroad Commission v. Pullman 6 two years before
Burford was decided. Scholars summarize the Pullman abstention as a
doctrine that "involve[s] challenges to state action in which resolution of
an unsettled state law issue could eliminate the need to decide a difficult
federal question. " 7 The Pullman abstention is primarily concerned with
avoidance of constitutional questions if the case can be resolved by resolution of a state law question. It is only secondarily interested in avoiding
friction between federal and state law. 8 The Buiford abstention on the
other hand is fundamentally concerned with preventing interference with
state law mechanisms, especially in areas of complex state interests.
Buiford broadened the justifications for abstention, allowing federal courts
to abstain in certain cases in order to prevent interference with state law. 9
This broadening of the abstention doctrine is, in part, what made Burford
controversial
Burford involved a suit brought by the Sun Oil Company in federal
district court seeking to enjoin an order by the Texas Railroad Commission
which granted Burford a permit to drill four oil wells on a relatively small
plot of ground in East Texas. 10 They order was attacked on both federal
due process grounds as well as on Texas statutory grounds. 11
Jurisdiction was achieved under the parties' diversity of citizenship
and under federal question jurisdiction. 12 The Court cited precedent for

See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 1247.
JAMES C. REHNQUIST, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention
46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1072 (1994).
/d. at 1077.
Burford, 319 U.S. at 317.
II. /d.at317.
12. Id. at 316-17.

5.
6.
7.
8.
Doctrine,
9.
10.
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federal court discretion (whether jurisdiction was invoked under diversity
of citizenship or under federal question) to "refuse to enforce or protect
legal rights, the exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest."13 The Court went on to say that when it is appropriate to preserve
public interest, federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction
over some cases in order to promote the proper independence of state governments in carrying out their policies. 14
The Court focused on the complexity of oil and gas regulation, the
Texas state interests in the conservation of gas and oil, and the impact on
the entire industry and state economy. 15 The Court recognized that Texas
had given the Texas Railroad Commission, which had broad discretion in
administering the law, the task of regulating the oil industry as well as balancing the other relevant interests. 16 The Court expressed concern that the
exercise of federal equity jurisdiction would disrupt "the well organized
system of regulation and review which the Texas statutes provide[d]," 17
which would also require state policy-makers to forge policy "in the light
of the remotest inference of federal court opinions." 18
Writing for the Court, Justice Black thought it significant that the
Texas state courts were "working partners" with the Railroad Commission
in the area of creating a regulatory system for the oil industry. 19 The Court
also identified what was to become a very important aspect of the Buiford
abstention in subsequent cases: state court de novo review of the Railroad
Commission's orders. 20
In the only other instance in where the Supreme Court used the
Buiford abstention, the Court concentrated on the fact that the appellants
had bypassed state court review altogether even though the state legislature
had provided for state court review as a matter of right. 21 Because the opportunity for state court review was readily available the Court held that
abstention was proper. The Court did not think that it was of great moment
that the state court review was not de novo. 22
The most recent and possibly the most significant Supreme Court
treatment of the Buiford abstention came in 1989 when the Court took the
opportunity to summarize the Buiford abstention doctrine-providing
what is possibly the clearest statement of the doctrine to date. Writing for

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

!d. at 318 (quoting United States v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 360 (1933)).
!d. (quoting Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935)).
!d. at 320.
!d. at 320-21.
!d. at 327.
!d. at 329.
!d. at 326.
!d.
Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 348 (1951).
!d. at 348.
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the Court in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of
New Orleans, Justice Scalia defined the abstention in this way:
Where timely and adequate state court review is available, a
federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with
the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1)
when there are "difficult question of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar"; or (2) where the
"exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern."23
ill. FACTS OF SIERRA CLUB V.

SAN ANTONIO

The Sierra Club, an environmental protection group, brought an action
against the City of San Antonio and various other municipalities and governmental and private entities in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas. The claim alleged that the defendants' usage of
water from the Edwards Aquifer was killing the fountain darter, an endangered species, in violation of the federal Endangered Species Act. The district court granted a preliminary injunction regulating the withdrawal of
water from the aquifer. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which subsequently found that
the district court's grant of preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion because the plaintiffs failed to show the requisite substantial likelihood of success on the merits. They failed to meet this requirement because abstention "appear[ed] so manifestly warranted under Buiford."24
IV. REASONING
The Fifth Circuit found Sierra Club to be, in many ways, similar to
Burford. 25 It discussed the similarities between the comprehensive regulatory schemes of oil and water in the state of Texas. The court concluded
that the regulation of the state's water supply was just as important, if not
more important than the regulation of the state's oil supply. 26 The court
stated that safeguarding the water supply was especially important during
times of drought, such as the one in which Texas then found itself. The

23. 491 U.S. at 361 (1989) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976}).
24. Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 793.
25. /d. at 793.
26. /d. at 794.
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court also explained that curtailing the water supply would have a substantial effect upon the communities and other entities involved. The court
cited the testimony of a consulting engineer from the City of Leon Valley
who testified that the restrictions which would result from the federal court
injunction would cause damage to 50% of the foundations in the city, with
damages to each foundation ranging from $2,000 to $20,000. 27
The court also explained how both the aquifer and the endangered species were completely intrastate, "which makes management of the aquifer
a matter of peculiar importance to the state." 28 The court thought that these
considerations prompted abstention because under Burford, these issues
bore on policy problems of substantial public import that transcended the
results of the case at bar.
A primary problem the court faced in applying the Burford abstention
was that the suit arose under the Endangered Species Act, a federally created cause of action. The fact that only a federal question is involved generally urges the exercise of the federal court's jurisdiction. The court addressed this issue by explaining that application of the "Burford abstention
does not so much turn on whether the plaintiff's cause of action is alleged
under federal or state law, as it does on whether the plaintiff's claim may
be 'in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be untangled
before the federal case can proceed.' " 29 The court also explained that although the case is based on federal law, it is not distinguish from Burford,
which also involved a federal constitutional claim. If abstention is warranted when there is an alleged constitutional claim, "then surely it is also
warranted where the plaintiff claims a federal statutory claim."30
The district court, in granting the preliminary injunction, reasoned that
because the Edwards Aquifer Authority had not had time to develop a plan
for managing the aquifer, abstention was not merited. 31 The circuit court
did not share the district court's perspective and stated that they did not
"believe that the Burford abstention is applicable only where the state regulatory scheme is fully in place."32 The court further commented that in
their view Burford itself did not turn on whether the regulatory scheme
was old or new, but only on whether or not it was a comprehensive scheme
that governed a matter of important state interest and where uniform application of state rules was vital. 33

27.

/d.
/d.
29. /d. at 795 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1726 (1996)).
30. /d. at 795-96.
31. /d. at 796.
32. ld.
33. /d.

28.
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The Sierra Club presented the biggest hurdle that the circuit court had
to overcome when it contended that the Burford abstention was inappropriate because there was no opportunity for state court review for plaintiffs
under the Edwards Aquifer Act. 34 While the court agreed that the Sierra
Club probably did not have a right of action in state court under state law it
still found abstention to be appropriate because it found "no authority that
the Burford abstention cannot apply unless the plaintiff himself has a private, judicial cause of action under the state regulatory scheme."35 The
court also said that "the Supreme Court had recently stated that there is no
'formulaic test for determining when dismissal under Burford is appropriate.' " 36
V. ANALYSIS

Sierra Club did not completely imitate either Burford or Alabama
Public Service Comm 'n, the two instances in which the Supreme Court
found the Burford abstention to apply. Both of those cases involve challenges to the orders of a state administrative agency, whereas Sierra Club
involves a suit brought under federal law not against administrative agencies, but against private parties. Still the exercise of federal jurisdiction in
such a case has the propensity to interfere with the proceedings or orders
of the administrative agency and would naturally tum to a discussion of
the Burford doctrine.
The decision in Burford gave a less than ordered and concise formula
to apply when lower courts considered abstention, causing confusion
among the applications of the Burford abstention in various federal

34. /d.
35. /d. at 797.
36. /d. (quoting New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)).
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courts. 37 In subsequent cases the Supreme Court condensed the doctrine,
producing a much shorter and clearer rule.
To present an ordered and concise analysis of Sierra Club it is useful
to separate and categorize the most recent and authoritative "restatement"
of the Buiford abstention found in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. The
distillation of the Buiford doctrine given by Justice Scalia can be broken
down into four factors that must be taken into consideration when a federal
court contemplates abstaining under Buiford. The first, and arguably the
most important, is whether or not timely and adequate state court review is
available. 38 The second is whether the federal court is sitting in equity. 39

37. Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administrative Law From Burford
to Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of Judicial Federalism Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and Kindred
Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 877-78 (1993):
The Supreme Court's Burford opinion provides no formula for applying this
variety of abstention. Any guidance must be extracted for the facts, both physical
and institutional, which were emphasized by the Court in reaching its decision.
The Court justified abstention on grounds of equitable discretion, stressing the
following factors:
(a) Congress left the regulation of oil and gas to the states;
(b) the state regulation was important because of the significance of
conservation of oil and gas generally, but more particularly, in light of the vital
importance of those mineral to the Texas economy;
(c) each oil and gas field had to be regulated as a unit because of great
factual complexities;
(d) because the standards applied in a given case involving oil leaseholds
necessarily affected the 'entire state conservation system,' suits such as Burford
were seen as public in nature, not merely as suits between private parties;
(e) because of the public ramifications surrounding private activities within
the oil industry, the Texas legislature delegated to the Texas Railroad
Commission the task of adjusting the complex relationships among those with
interests in the oilfields;
(f) the Commission was given 'broad discretion in administering the law';
(g) judicial review of decisions of the Railroad Commission was confined
to a single expert court, under a statutory directive to acquire a specialized
knowledge of oil and gas regulation;
(h) by statutory directive, the function of the specialized court was not
simply to engage in ordinary judicial review, but also to act as a 'working
partner' with the Railroad Commission, having some arguably 'legislative
powers' in 'shaping' regulatory policy;
(I) there was a history of mistaken federal court predictions of state
regulatory law regarding oil allocation so disruptive that at one point the
governor thought it necessary to impose martial law.
The opinion did not indicate which of the bewilderingly large number of
possible combinations of these factors would be sufficient to warrant abstention.
The particularism and lack of formulaic explanation, typical of an opinion based
upon equitable discretion, has led to Burford's ambiguity and to its great
malleability in the hands of the federal courts, from the lowest to the highest
level.
38. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 491 U.S. at 361 (1989).
39. /d.
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The third is whether there is a state administrative proceeding or order. 40
The fourth contains two prongs: (1) whether there are "difficult questions
of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose
importance transcends the result in the case then at bar"; or (2) whether the
exercise of federal review would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern. 41
A. Timely and Adequate State Court Review

Satisfaction of the other Burford factors does not appear to be enough
to warrant abstention if there is no timely and adequate state court review.
The Supreme Court has explained that "while Burford is concerned with
protecting complex state administrative processes from undue federal influence, it does not require abstention whenever there exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a 'potential conflict' with state regulatory law or policy."42 Given the Court's explanation it is curious that the
Fifth Circuit was willing to hold that abstention is proper under the
Burford doctrine in light of the fact that no adequate and timely state court
review existed, which is probably the most important factor in the Burford
analysis. In Sierra Club, it is likely that no state court review could occur
for these plaintiffs because under the Edwards Aquifer Act, the Sierra
Club does not have a private right of action. 43 Judge Reavely explains his
position with the words, "we find no authority that Burford abstention cannot apply unless the plaintiff himself has a private, judicial cause of action
under the state regulatory scheme, and the Supreme Court has recently
stated that there is no 'formulaic test for determining when dismissal under
Burford is appropriate.' "44
Indeed the Supreme Court has said that there is no formulaic test for
determining when dismissal is appropriate, but in the same breath the
Court has said that the federal court should conduct a balancing test "based
on a careful consideration of the federal interests in retaining jurisdiction
over the dispute and the competing concern for the 'independence of state
actton,' that the State's interests are paramount and that a dispute would
best be adjudicated in a state forum." 45 The Court restated this important
balancing test again in the same paragraph and then concluded the paragraph by confirming that "[t]his balance only rarely favors abstention, and

40. Id.
41. Jd.
42. ld. at 362 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 815-16 (1976)).
43. Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 796.
44. ld. at 797 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1726 (1996)).
45. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1726 (1996).
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the power to dismiss recognized in Burford represents an 'extraordinary
and narrow exception to the duty of the District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.' "46
There is little evidence that the court in Sierra Club conducted any
such balancing test. Indeed, even if a balancing test were carried out, the
result becomes even more troubling. It is reckless for a federal court to set
at naught the federally enacted Endangered Species Act in order to avoid
conflict with a state regulatory scheme. Such an action allows the tail of
state regulatory schemes to wag the dog of federal law. Furthermore, this
revision of the Buiford doctrine encourages states to drop state court review altogether from their administrative schemes, thus completely averting the annoyance of private rights of action against the states' administrative agencies both at the state and federal level.
The Sierra Club approach also creates the interesting situation where
abstention becomes the rule instead of the exception. If every federal court
were to abstain in cases brought under federal law because of the potential
for conflict with a state administrative scheme, abstention would rapidly
become the norm, a scenario which has been consistently denounced by
the Supreme Court. 47
Even more troubling is the apparent disregard for the fact that the federal forum was the only forum available to the plaintiffs in this case. The
Buiford balancing test should place greater weight on the fact that the federal forum is the exclusive forum for this particular suit. Such a careless
attitude offends a fundamental philosophy of American jurisprudence that
a forum should be available for every controversy. 48
The dissent points out that the view taken by the Sierra Club court is
inconsistent with prior precedent within the Fifth Circuit itself. The dissent
identifies a case in which the Fifth Circuit held that the Buiford abstention
is inapplicable when a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's claim. 49 Sierra Club is not the first time that the Fifth Circuit
has decided that state court review is not critical to the Buiford analysis. In
New Orleans Public Service, Inc., the Fifth Circuit did not think that the
absence of a state law claim was momentous because the "motivating force
behind the Burford abstention was a reluctance to intrude into state proceedings where there exists a complex state regulatory scheme. " 50 In reversing that decision the Supreme Court responded by explaining that
while it is important to protect complex state administrative processes from

46. /d. at 1727.
47. /d.
48. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
49. See Evans v. Dale, 896 F.2d 975, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1990).
50. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans et. al., 798 F.2d.
858, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1986).
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federal court interruption it is not dispositive. 51 Given this treatment of
their previous ruling it is mystifying that the Fifth Circuit decided to apply
the Buiford abstention in a similar manner.
B. The Federal Court Sitting in Equity

The second factor to consider is whether or not the suit is in equity. It
is significant that the Supreme Court sought to limit the Buiford abstention
to suits in equity because the abstention doctrines originated from such
equity suits. By limiting abstention to suits in equity the Court "provides a
rationale (equitable discretion) for harmonizing abstention with the arguably mandatory nature of the statutory grants of jurisdiction to the federal
courts. " 52
In Sierra Club the plaintiffs asked the federal court to enjoin the City
of San Antonio as well as various other defendants from pumping more
water from the Edwards Aquifer in an alleged violation of the Endangered
Species Act. In this way the second factor is satisfied and abstention is
counseled, although it is not given the same attention which the other factors in the Buiford analysis are given.
C.

The Existence of a State Regulatory Scheme

When applying the Buiford factors to the facts arising in Sierra Club it
is clear that most of the factors are satisfied. There are certainly factors that
would caution a federal court from issuing an injunction in this case. In
this regard it is understandable that the circuit court would look to the
Buiford abstention as a means of averting a federal question whose resolution could have a substantial impact on, and could potentially conflict with
Texas administrative law. 53 It is not questioned that there was in place a
regulatory scheme created for the purpose of regulating the flow of water
from the Edwards Aquifer. 54 The fact that the regulatory scheme was only
recently created may counsel abstention if it is viewed from the perspective
that the new administrative agency should have an opportunity to "get its
feet wet" before a federal court preempts that scheme.
However, the regulatory scheme's recent creation can be viewed from
another perspective which strengthens the argument against abstention. If
the federal district court were to exercise its jurisdiction in a case where
the administrative agency was relatively new and very little regulation had
occurred it would not be as disruptive of the agency's efforts to establish a

51.
52.
53.
54.

New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 491 U.S. at 362.
Young, supra note 37, at 910.
Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 796.
/d.
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policy. Instead the agency would be able to create policy in light of the
federal court's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act.
In the end the court in Sierra Club did not think that the case should
turn on whether the regulatory scheme was old or new, but on whether or
not it was a "comprehensive scheme governing a matter of vital state interest, and one where uniform application of the rules was important."55
D.

Difficult Questions of State Law of Substantial Public Import

The regulation of the water drawn from the Edwards Aquifer is undoubtedly of substantial public import. The Edwards Aquifer is the exclusive water supply for the City of San Antonio, a city of over one million
people, as well as for many of its smaller neighbors. 56 It is also quite possible that the result of this case would have far-reaching effects that would
transcend its result. There is the possibility that an injunction would prevent any pumping of water from the Edwards Aquifer entirely. Furthermore, if the federal court were to have issued an injunction against the defendants the Edwards Aquifer Authority would have less autonomy and
less control over the Edwards Aquifer. Indeed an injunction by a federal
court in this case may well have left the Edwards Aquifer Authority with
nothing to regulate if all pumping of the aquifer were enjoined. Equally
important, the exercise of federal review in this case certainly had the propensity to disrupt the Edwards Aquifer Authority's efforts to establish a
coherent policy with regard to the pumping of the aquifer.
In light of these considerations it may seem proper to finesse the
question of timely and adequate state court review and order abstention, as
the Sierra Club court did. Certainly these latter Buiford considerations are
weighty and counsel abstention in this case, but there is no evidence that
the Supreme Court ever intended for these considerations to be paramount
especially in a case in which the impact is largely speculative. After all, the
Court has said that "[ w]hile Burford is concerned with protecting complex
state administrative processes from undue federal interference, it does not
require abstention whenever there exists such a process, or even in all
cases where there is a 'potential for conflict' with state regulatory law or
policy. " 57
Sierra Club seems to present the exact scenario that the Supreme
Court envisioned when it warned against using the Buiford abstention.
While it is likely that an injunction would interfere with the state regulatory scheme, there is no guarantee that an injunction would be issued. Further, there is no guarantee that an injunction would have the feared far

55.
56.
57.

/d. at 796.
/d. at 791.

New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 491 U.S. at 362.

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

386

[Volume 12

reaching effects. Essentially, the problem that the circuit court cannot
avoid is the one discussed above, that this is a case between private parties
controlled exclusively by federal law which would affect the Edwards
Aquifer Authority only indirectly. Ordering abstention in this case robs the
Sierra Club of both a federal forum in which to litigate their claim and literally any forum in which it might bring its claim.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The appropriate scope of the Burford abstention continues to be ambiguous, creating opportunity for apparent misapplications of the abstention such as in Sierra Club. This is in part due to the Supreme Court's apparent vacillation in the area. 58 Another source of misunderstanding is the
fact that the concise test laid down by the Court in New Orleans Public
Service, Inc. includes a balancing test which leaves open the door for varying applications of the Burford doctrine as it is applied by different federal
courts. 59 Balancing tests have been historically problematic because they
require value judgments on the part of the court applying the test. Clearly,
values may vary greatly among federal judges. As long as the Burford doctrine is subject to the balancing test, a spectrum of outcomes will result.
The area confronted by the Burford abstention does not lend itself to a
bright-line test that would eliminate the need for such a balancing test. As
a result, the balancing tests will continue as will the varied results.
If the Sierra Club court's view of the Burford abstention were the prevailing view, abstention would quickly become the rule instead of the exception. In a great many instances, a decision by a federal court may affect
the actions and policy of a state administrative agency. If abstention is
proper in such circumstances, abstention in federal courts will become the
norm contradicting everything said by the Supreme Court in Burford regarding the abstention doctrines. The Court has envisioned an application
of the Burford abstention in cases in which the state courts are working
partners with the administrative agencies in formulating administrative
policy, 60 or in cases in which state court review is available to the plaintiffs.61 The Burford abstention was created to allow federal courts to avoid
conflict with state administrative law when possible. But even this admirable goal becomes controversial in light of the basic principle of American
jurisprudence that federal courts have no more discretion to decline to exercise their Congressionally established jurisdiction than they do to usurp

58.
59.
60.
61.

Quackenbush, 116 S.Ct. at 1726.
/d. at 1727.
Burford, 319 U.S. at 325-26.
Alabama Public Service Comm'n., 341 U.S. 341.
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jurisdiction where none has been granted. 62 To avoid a potential conflict
with state law, at the expense of providing a forum in which a plaintiff
may litigate its claim, Sierra Club clearly extended the Burford doctrine
beyond that which was originally envisioned in Burford.

David Carter

62. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404 (1821).

